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John Rawls is arguably the most important political philosopher
of the past century. His theory of justice has set the agenda for
debate in mainstream political philosophy for the past forty
years, and has had an important influence in economics, law,
sociology, and other disciplines. However, despite the
importance and popularity of Rawls’s work, there is (rather
surprisingly) no clear picture of what a society that met Rawls’s
principles of justice would actually look like.
Much of the confusion arises from the frequent description of
Rawls as a proponent of a redistributive welfare state regime.
While Rawls’s principles of justice do provide philosophical
support for the redress of existing inequalities and for the
substantial redistribution of resources, it is incorrect to say that
he favoured welfare state regimes in anything resembling their
current form. In fact, Rawls was a strong critic of what he
termed “welfare state capitalism” and an advocate of an
institutional alternative which he termed “property-owning
democracy.” Discussion of “property-owning democracy”
occupied only a very small part of his seminal A Theory of
Justice (1971), and was passed over entirely in Political
Liberalism (1993). But in his final statement of his view of
social justice (Justice as Fairness, 2001) Rawls provided
pointed and explicit (albeit rather brief) discussion of the
essential contrasts between welfare state capitalism and
property-owning democracy, and explained why he believed that
the welfare state could not in fact realize his two principles of
justice.
Nonetheless, the concept of property-owning democracy is not
well understood, and is still only rarely treated as integral to
Rawls’s theory of justice. The aim of this review article is
threefold. First, we review how Rawls and his leading
interpreters have described the concept of property-owning
democracy. Second, we examine how the notion of “propertyowning democracy” has recently been appropriated by nonRawlsian political philosophers working in the republican
tradition, who have developed arguments from non-Rawlsian
premises which also favour the widespread dispersion of
property ownership. Third, we briefly review recent work
attempting to translate the general notion of a property-owning
democracy into concrete institutional and policy proposals that
might be adopted by advanced industrialized nations.

A Theory of Justice and Property-Owning
Democracy
The hugely ambitious aim of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice is to
specify a public understanding of justice appropriate to societies
committed to both individual freedom and democratic equality.
Rawls develops his theory of justice explicitly in opposition to
utilitarianism, understood as a public philosophy which equates
both goodness and justice with the maximization of aggregate
human welfare. Rawls believed that utilitarianism provided an
inadequate philosophical grounding for an array of rights
commonly associated with liberal democracies (such as freedom
of speech and other civil liberties) and also failed to take
individuals sufficiently seriously as important in their own right:
a strictly utilitarian understanding of justice, for instance, could
not preclude in advance depriving a minority of citizens of their
liberties or denying them basic resources in order to advance the
interests of the majority. As Rawls famously put it,
“utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between
persons.”1
Rawls also recognized, and was concerned to counteract, the
force of traditional objections to the very idea of justice,
exemplified by Marx and other skeptics dating back to the
character Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic. In this view,
“justice” refers simply to the norms and rules governing a
particular society—norms and rules which inevitably have the
purpose and effect of justifying the status quo and benefitting
the ruling class of a given society. For instance, in Marx’s view,
under capitalism, there is no injustice, as such, involved in a
laborer selling their labor time to a capitalist, who then exploits
the laborer by appropriating the product of that labor and selling
it for a profit. Under capitalist conceptions of justice, this is
simply a voluntary transaction, even if the labourer’s only other
choice was living in extreme penury, or starving to death. On
this view, conceptions of justice can only be internal to a given
society, and cannot provide an independent standard for judging
a society’s institutions. Those who are in charge set the rules and
then they also get to call it justice.2
Similarly, our day-to-day judgments about what is just and fair
can often be shaped and distorted by our own gender, race, and
class position. Highly educated college graduates may be more
likely to believe that those who have the best education should
be given more money and power. Men may be more likely to
1 Rawls (1971: 24). Page citations to A Theory of Justice in this article
refer to the 1999 revised edition.
2 Whether Marx was as hostile to the idea of justice as some of his more
dismissive comments suggest is a disputed question, and one Rawls
examines at some length in his Lectures on the History of Political
Philosophy. Rawls takes the view (drawing on the work of G.A.Cohen)
that Marx does have a normative conception of justice underlying his
analysis of capitalism, albeit one that is not explicitly expressed. See
Rawls (2007): 335-371. See also G.A. Cohen (1989).
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believe that the disproportionate numbers of men in positions of
power are a result either of men’s inherent superior fitness for
such roles or the result of choices made by individual women
not to pursue such positions. Middle-class people may be more
likely to believe that the poor are largely to blame for their own
condition, and managers at capitalist firms may be more likely
to believe that they should have the right to issue orders to
subordinates.
Rawls’s theory of justice aims both to provide an alternative to
utilitarianism and an answer to skeptics who believe that
impartial justice is impossible or that justice is at bottom a sort
of disingenuous ‘code language’, designed to uphold the status
quo. The principal mechanism Rawls invokes to develop his
conception of justice is the idea of the Original Position (OP). In
the Original Position, independent individuals come together for
the purpose of selecting principles of justice that will govern
their entire society. In the OP, every individual will be under a
“veil of ignorance” with respect to their individual identity:
individuals will not have any information about their race,
gender, class position, educational attainment, religious beliefs,
and so on. They will know that they wish to live a self-directed
life and to form and pursue a rational life plan, and they will
know that they need certain resources (what Rawls calls
“primary goods”) to pursue those plans; they will also be aware
of certain basic principles of psychology, sociology, and
economics regarding the nature of human societies and how they
operate (i.e., the notion that people’s behaviour is influenced by
material incentives.) At the outset of A Theory of Justice, Rawls
argues that the governing principles that would be chosen in this
3
initial position should be regarded as just.
Rawls argues that two principles of justice would be selected:
roughly speaking, a principle of liberty and a principle of
equality. The liberty principle calls for providing each citizen
with “a fully adequate scheme of equal liberties, which scheme
is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.” 4 What
Rawls has in mind here principally are civil liberties and not (as
in libertarian conceptions) the untrammelled right of individuals
to profit from property holding or to enter into exchanges of any
kind. The equality principle is twofold: all citizens are to have
an equal opportunity to aspire to positions, offices and (more
generally) social advancement (the “principle of fair equality of
opportunity”); and inequalities between citizens are to be limited
to those which maximally help the least well off group in society
(the “difference principle”). Rawls accords absolute or “lexical”
priority to the liberty principle and, within the equality principle,
to the guarantee of fair equality of opportunity over the
enactment of the difference principle. Thus, subject to the
satisfaction of the liberty principle and the other part of the
equality principle, political-economic arrangements must be
organized so as to maximize the position of the least well off
relative to any other possible arrangement.5
3 Rawls (1971): 10-19. It is important to recognize, however, that Rawls
does not regard the OP as static. If it can be shown that in the OP the
agents will reach principles of justice conflicting with our considered
judgments, then the description of the OP is to be revised so as to yield a
different result. In effect, the OP functions as a mechanism for testing
intuitions about just principles. For useful discussion, see Kymlicka
(2002): 63-70.
4 Rawls (2001): 42. We quote here from the revised statement of the two
principles presented in Justice as Fairness.
5 As Samuel Freeman puts it, the difference principle calls for selecting
that political-economic system which tends over time to maximize the
position of the least well off; and it calls for maximizing the actual
position of the least well off within that chosen system. So the difference

The “difference principle” therefore can be seen as having a dual
function. On the one hand, it sets a limit (however vaguely) on
the scope of acceptable inequalities. On the other hand, given
plausible assumptions about the role of incentives in stimulating
productivity, it effectively mandates inequalities, so long as such
inequalities maximally benefit those at the bottom of society.
Rawls, in effect, endorses an affluent society with inequality and
a high standard of living for the worst off as superior to a poorer
society with little inequality. Here Rawls accepts the standard
economist’s view that there is a trade-off between strict equality
and efficiency, and that material inequalities provide incentives
for spurring the effort of economic producers, potentially to the
benefit of all. Notably, Rawls also rejects the notion that
inequality in itself is an overriding moral bad;6 what is bad are
inequalities which cement the superior position of the most welloff, or which generate social harms, such as the domination of
one part of society by another, or the loss of self-respect among
the badly off.7
Given this set of principles, the task for Rawls is to specify a
political economy that would be consistent with basic individual
liberties (such as the liberty to choose one’s employment and
important liberties of political participation); that would provide
substantially equal opportunities to all citizens; and that would
limit runaway inequalities that create permanent classes or that
undermine the notion that society is a joint system of
cooperation aimed at a common end. By the time of writing A
Theory of Justice¸ Rawls had already ruled out centralized state
socialism as a plausible vehicle for realizing these principles;
state socialism (among its other problems) systematically
violated basic liberties (such as freedom of employment and
political liberties). Rawls thus assumed that a just society must,
in some sense, be a market society. But in A Theory of Justice,
(and even more explicitly in Justice as Fairness, to which we
will turn later in this discussion) Rawls left open the question as
to whether the just society would be either capitalist or socialist
in character. A just society based on the private control of
capital, however, should take a different form than traditional or
“really existing” capitalist societies: instead of the control of
capital being highly concentrated among a narrow band of
citizens, it should be dispersed as widely as possible. That idea
represents the core kernel of “property-owning democracy.”

principle regulates both the broad choice of institutional arrangements
and the selection of specific policies (i.e., taxes, transfers, labor laws)
within a given arrangement. Importantly, Rawls does not equate
maximizing the position of the least well-off with maximizing their
incomes and wealth, but rather maximizing an index of the broader
bundle of primary goods that affect one’s sense of self-respect and
overall life chances. See Freeman (2007a): 102-109 and Freeman
(2007b): 111-115.
6 Derek Parfit (1991) gives the label “Telic egalitarianism” to the view
that inequality is in itself bad. On the rejection of “Telic egalitarianism”
and for discussion of Rawls’s views regarding the badness of inequality,
see Martin O’Neill, “What Should Egalitarians Believe?” (2008a). G.A.
Cohen criticizes Rawls’s theory of justice on a closely related issue,
regarding Rawls’s attitude to inequality (Cohen, 2008). In Cohen’s view,
the inequalities permitted by the difference principle may be sensible,
but should not be regarded as just. Cohen argues in effect that Rawls
wrongly elides justice as such with more pragmatic concerns in
developing his account of social justice. Even if Cohen’s critique is
accepted, that does not make Rawls’s ideas about property-owning
democracy any less interesting or important; it simply means (to take
Cohen’s view) that we should regard it as an effort to specify what a
real-world political economy that balanced justice against other
important considerations looks like.
7 See Rawls (2001), pp. 130-2. See also Scanlon, (1996); O’Neill
(2008a).
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Rawls on the Institutional Framework of a Just Economy
Rawls did not claim to have worked out the details of a politicaleconomic regime corresponding to the idea of a propertyowning democracy; his aim was simply to indicate the general
outlines of the sort of political economy that might be fully
consistent with the principles of justice as fairness. Moreover,
this outline is pitched at the level of ideal-type regime analysis
in Rawls’s writings, and it thereby self-consciously passes over
detailed questions of “political sociology” regarding how such a
8
regime will function in practice.
In the broadest possible terms, a property-owning democracy
will be a market economy in which holdings of capital are
widely dispersed across the population. The view is that fair
equality of opportunity and limited inequality can be better
achieved through a more broad-based distribution of initial
holdings rather than by relying on the mechanism of “after-thefact” redistributive taxation. A property-owning democracy
would be a “regime in which land and capital are widely though
not presumably equally held,” in which “[s]ociety is not so
divided that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance
of productive resources,” and which is able to “prevent
concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political
liberty and fair equality of opportunity.”9
In many respects, the institutional structure Rawls proposes in A
Theory of Justice for a property-owning democracy is familiar to
citizens living under welfare state capitalism. Rawls assumes
that there will be a political constitution providing basic
liberties, a public sector that provides public goods (including an
educational system that will provide “equal chances of education
and culture for persons similarly endowed and motivated”), and
a market and price system with a suitable system of regulation.
Rawls goes on to specify five separate branches of government
oversight, dealing with regulation of markets, macro-economic
policy, social transfers (with each citizen guaranteed a social
minimum), the distribution of property, and the provision of
non-essential public goods. The overall picture is of a mixed
economy with a judicious blend of market mechanisms and
government oversight, embedded within a system of basic
liberties (such as freedom of career choice). 10

transfers relative to alterations in the distribution of property in
achieving a relatively egalitarian economy. Welfare state
capitalism aims at providing an economic baseline as well as
certain public goods (education, health care, housing) to all
citizens; this is achieved primarily through redistributive
taxation (what Rawls terms transfers). Property-owning
democracy also aims to provide an economic baseline to the
“least well off,” but it has a further goal as well: preventing large
concentrations of wealth and dispersing ownership of property
as widely as possible. One might say that welfare state
capitalism simply wants to provide a social baseline at the
bottom, whereas property-owning democracy also wants to put
limits on accumulation at the top, thereby narrowing overall
inequality from both directions (top and bottom). Moreover,
property-owning democracy is also concerned to engage in
redistribution in additional dimensions: i.e., not just the
redistribution of income characteristic of welfare state
capitalism, but also the redistribution of wealth and capital
assets (as well as ensuring a more equitable distribution of
human capital).11
In terms of how such goals might be realized, Rawls points to
inheritance taxes as the best mechanism for distributing property
more widely and preventing large estates from being transferred
in whole from one generation to another. Here Rawls cites
proposals for taxation on intergenerational transfers developed
by economist James Meade; persons receiving such transfers
would owe progressively higher taxes on these gifts according to
how many such gifts they had received over their lifetime.
Rawls does not stipulate that each person must receive an
inheritance, and rejects the idea that there is an inherent injustice
in some persons receiving more gifts than another (so long as
this takes place within the framework of an overall system that
is just).12 For Rawls, inheritance taxes have a more limited,
though vital function: preventing large concentrations of wealth
from being transmitted inter-generationally. This aim in turn
corresponds to a social ideal in which there is no permanent
class of politically privileged holders of wealth and capital
sufficiently powerful to extract gains for itself that do not
function to benefit the least well off.
Left Critiques of A Theory of Justice

What, then, makes property-owning democracy distinct from
welfare state capitalism? The distinction is to be found in the
relative weight accorded in importance to “after-the-fact” social
8 The most sustained discussion of property-owning democracy offered
by Rawls can found in Chapter V, of A Theory of Justice (1971),
especially section 43, and again in the Preface to the French edition of A
Theory of Justice (reproduced as the preface to the revised edition of TJ,
see especially at pp. xiv-xvi). The most systematic discussion comes in
pages 135-140 of Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001). (The idea
is given no attention at all in Political Liberalism [1993].) Given this
paucity of discussion in Rawls’s formal published writings, the
discussion here is particularly informed by four further sources. These
include a pair of articles in 1986 and 1987 by Krouse and McPherson
that pay attention to Rawls’s notion of a POD and try to draw out some
of its implications (Krouse and McPherson, 1986, 1987); various
publications by the British economist James Meade in the 1960s and
1970s describing a “property-owning democracy”, from which Rawls
explicitly takes the name for his preferred socioeconomic regime
(Meade, 1965a, 1965b, 1975, 1993); work by one of Rawls’s prominent
students, Joshua Cohen, specifying the problematic relationship between
capitalism and democracy (especially Cohen, 1989); and finally, Rawls’s
own recently published lectures on Karl Marx highlighting the contrast
between Rawls’ conception of a just society organized as a propertyowning democracy and Marx’s ideal of communism (Rawls, 2007).
9 Rawls (1971): 247, 245.
10 Rawls (1971): 242-251; quotation on education at 243.

As noted above, Rawls’s remarks describing his favoured
socioeconomic regime in A Theory of Justice are rather sparse;
Rawls devotes just 9 of the 514 pages of the book to discussion
of “property-owning democracy,” and only mentions the term in
the main text twice. Perhaps as a result of the lack of detail on
this issue, a number of left-wing critics took Rawls to be
advocating welfare state policies which would enable capitalist
processes to produce as much as wealth as possible, while
redistributive processes located in the state assured that the
“least well off” received as much in the way of (compensatory)
economic resources as economically feasible.13 The notion of a
capitalist welfare state that could in fact maximize the position
of the least well off immediately struck many critics on the left
as implausible. In one of the best-developed early critiques of
Rawls, Barry Clark and Herbert Gintis argued that Rawls relied
11 As subsequent commentators have noted, such equalization of wealth
and assets also has implications for how work is to be organized. See
Hsieh (2009).
12 Rawls (1971): 245.
13 In Justice as Fairness, Rawls admits that the distinction between
welfare state capitalism and property-owning democracy “is not
sufficiently noted in Theory.” Rawls (2001): 135 n2.
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on citizens holding an implausibly expansive sense of social
justice, in order to facilitate the redistribution required to
“correct” the inequalities generated by capitalism, so as to meet
the requirements of the difference principle.14 In a related
critique, Gerald Doppelt argued that Rawls failed to appreciate
the impact of relative economic position, particularly in the
production process, on the generation of self-respect.
Consequently, Doppelt suggested that the different ways in
which Rawls treated the cases of, on the one hand, civil and
personal liberties (which are to be distributed equally, as a
matter of assuring the conditions of self-respect for all) and, on
the other hand, positions and power in the production process
(which can be distributed unequally without undermining
fundamental self-respect), was normatively unjustifiable when
one considered the effects of inequality on status and selfrespect.15 Likewise, David Schweickart argued that the logic of
Rawls’s theory of justice should have led him to embrace
democratic socialism as the social system most capable of
realizing his favoured principles.16
In an important response to these early critiques, Arthur
DiQuattro defended Rawls against the charge that he is a
supporter of traditional capitalism or of a system of social
classes (understood in the Marxist sense of the term). In
particular, DiQuattro argued that Rawls did not envisage a
society divided between owners and non-owners of capital; in
short, Rawls did not endorse capitalism, and did not assume that
the allowances made for socioeconomic inequality under the
second principle of justice necessitated a capitalist organization
of production. In defending Rawls from these challenges from
the left, DiQuattro quite properly called attention to the crucial
distinction Rawls made between property-owning democracy
and capitalism.17
Shortly thereafter, Richard Krouse and Michael McPherson
offered the first sustained effort in the literature to engage with
what Rawls meant by property-owning democracy.18 Drawing
on both Rawls’s writings and James Meade’s efforts to describe
a property-owning democracy, Krouse and McPherson show
how both a concern for the fair value of the political liberties
and the difference principle point in the direction of a regime
that broadens property ownership directly, rather than a welfare
state dependent on large-scale ex post redistributions to limit
inequality. While some redistribution via taxation will be
necessary even in a property-owning democracy, the
fundamental mechanism for achieving an egalitarian society
must be to “[limit] the concentration of property over time.”
Krouse and McPherson then went on to pose four critical
questions, quoted verbatim below:
1. What institutional means are required to preserve [an]
egalitarian distribution [of property] over time (should it at some
time be achieved), and indeed can adequate means be described?
2. What would life in a property-owning democracy be like?
Would the combination of (relatively) egalitarian property
ownership and competitive markets produce a society that was
acceptably ‘well-ordered’, harmonious, and stable?

14 Clark and Gintis (1978)
15 Doppelt (1981)
16 Schweickart (1979)
17 DiQuattro (1983)
18 Krouse and McPherson (1986, 1987)

3. Can a theory of justice illuminate the choice between the best
private property regime—property-owning democracy—and the
best socialist arrangements for providing justice?
4. How can this characterization of the ideal property-owning
democracy help to guide the process of reform in existing,
nonideal, private property societies?19
Justice as Fairness on Property-Owning Democracy
Well-developed answers to each of the questions posed by
Krouse and McPherson are still lacking in the literature. 20
Indeed, in the 1990s, most critical debate about Rawls’s system
of justice followed the agenda set by his own Political
Liberalism (1993), examining the question of whether a liberal
egalitarian account of justice should aspire to being
“comprehensive” as opposed to merely “political.” Rawls
argued that liberal principles of justice can in fact be endorsed
by persons with widely varying comprehensive religious and
philosophical doctrines, and with varying conceptions of the
good life, and need not (and, indeed, must not) involve one
dominant social group imposing its own particular value
commitments or comprehensive philosophical doctrine on
others.
Accordingly, attention to questions of distributive justice and the
idea of property-owning democracy faded to the background of
the debate about political liberalism. Indeed, some observers
have noted an internal connection between Rawls’s
argumentation for political liberalism and the reduced
prominence of distributive justice in his writings: a generation of
debate among political theorists in the wake of A Theory of
Justice, as well as the strong rightward turn in politics in both
the United States and the UK in the 1980s, made it abundantly
clear that the stringently egalitarian requirements of the
difference principle were unlikely ever to command universal
assent among philosophers, let alone among the broader
public.21 That political fact in turn calls into doubt the broader
project of developing principles of justice that both have “real
teeth” and that could also be widely accepted within highly
diverse modern societies.
Rawls himself at times seemed to downgrade the standing of the
difference principle within his account of justice in Political
Liberalism.22 For instance, Rawls argued that firm principles of
distributive justice need not (and ought not) be written into the
political constitutions of just societies, and that application of
distributive principles should be left to legislators. This aspect of
Rawls’s view can be explained by his understandable reluctance
to see complex social policy questions settled in the courts, but
nevertheless his proposed solution could be seen as giving the
realization of distributive justice a status that is contingent on
the decisions and preferences of legislators (who Rawls assumes
19 Krouse and McPherson (1988): 99-100.
20 A forthcoming volume edited by O’Neill and Williamson (2010) is
intended to redress that gap.
21 Chambers (2006)
22 Thus Simone Chambers argues that while “the difference principle
lives on as Rawls’s favored interpretation of economic justice,” in
Political Liberalism he no longer insists that “it is the only possible
candidate for a fair principle.” Further, Chambers observes, “In addition
to demoting its status within the theory, there is a more subtle fading
away of the topic. Social justice is no longer front and center. His
growing concern to find a view of justice that would be compatible with
pluralism came to overshadow his deep commitment to egalitarianism.”
Chambers (2006): 86.
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will accept and seek to implement the difference principle).23
Given that really-existing democratic politics is rarely, if ever,
characterized by consensus on fundamental principles of justice,
especially in the context of countries like the United States,
leaving the difference principle’s fate in the hands of democratic
politics has struck some commentators as tantamount to
abandoning it.24 That note of ambiguity in turn signalled a
broader tension within Rawls’s theory: whether Rawls intended
his theory of justice to reflect the self-understanding of existing
democratic societies (an interpretation lent support by his
engagement with the tradition of American constitutional law in
Political Liberalism) or whether he intended the theory to be
critical of existing institutional practices as well as inegalitarian
social views. One can also see this tension as embodying a
broader tension between some of the different roles that Rawls
identifies for political philosophy: for example, between the
fundamentally progressive enterprise of identifying a “realistic
utopia”, as against the less radical, Hegelian task of offering a
“reconciliation” to our existing social world.25
It is thus a striking fact than in his final sustained statement
about justice, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), Rawls
‘lays down his cards’ so to speak: more than in any previous
book, he makes it clear that he believes that contemporary
capitalist societies, especially the United States, have veered far
away from realizing liberal principles of justice. It is here as
well that we find the most detailed contrast between, on the one
hand, welfare state capitalism, which Rawls rejects, and, on the
other hand, property-owning democracy and liberal socialism,
both of which he is prepared to endorse. Rawls argues that either
property-owning democracy or liberal socialism could in theory
realize principles of justice, and argues that the choice between
the two should be made on the basis of contingent historical and
cultural factors. The implication seems here to be that in
societies like the United States, with weak socialist traditions
and a strong cultural emphasis on entrepreneurial individualism,
property-owning democracy is the more likely vehicle for
realizing the just society (with liberal socialism perhaps a more
suitable option in societies with more collectivist political
cultures or stronger socialist traditions).
In an equally striking move, Rawls in Justice as Fairness
(approvingly citing Krouse and McPherson) rests the argument
for property-owning democracy not primarily in terms of the
demands of the second principle of justice, but rather in terms of
the first principle. Rawls argues that the widespread political
inequalities generated by welfare state capitalism represent a
systemic violation of the “fair values of the political liberties.”
Unlike other liberties, the fair value of the political liberties
must be distributed equally; a society in which this is not the
case cannot be considered to be either self-governing or free. 26
23 Rawls (1993). Importantly, however, Rawls does treat provision of a
social minimum “providing for the basic needs of all citizens” as a
constitutional essential; see Rawls (2003), pp. 228-29.
24 Thus see Thomas (2009), who argues for constitutionally
guaranteeing the fair value of the political liberties. Such a constitutional
guarantee, in his view, would preclude democratic politics from
sanctioning excessive inequalities, while avoiding the need to lock in
place any particular institutional scheme designed to realize propertyowning democracy. See also J. Cohen (2003) for a critique of Rawls’s
supposition that consensus can be reached on the content of justice in
actual democratic polities.
25 See Rawls, (2001), pp. 1-5.
26 In A Theory of Justice Rawls also connected arguments for
inheritance taxes to the requirement of maintaining the fair value of
political liberties, as well for realizing fair equality of opportunity. There
Rawls states that “it seems” that “a wide dispersal of property is a

This move is important both for its own sake and because it
means that Rawls’s arguments for property-owning democracy
are thereby not solely contingent on acceptance of the
controversial difference principle. Nonetheless, as well as its
falling short with regard to the first principle, Rawls also makes
clear that a predictable consequence of the concentration of
wealth and political power characteristic of welfare state
capitalism is that such polities rarely if ever are able to enact
redistributive policies sufficiently strong to establish and
maintain intergenerational equality of opportunity, or to limit
objectionable inequalities which serve no social purpose other
than the enrichment of the already privileged.
According to Justice as Fairness, one of the main aims of
property-owning democracy is “to prevent a small part of
society from controlling the economy, and indirectly, political
life as well…
Property-owning democracy avoids this, not by the
redistribution of income to those with less at the end of
each period, so to speak, but rather by ensuring the
widespread ownership of assets and human capital
(that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning
of each period, all this against a background of fair
equality of opportunity. The intent is not simply to
assist those who lose out through accident or
misfortune (although that must be done), but rather to
put all citizens in a position to manage their own
affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and
economic equality. (Rawls, 2001: 139).

Rawls goes onto describe POD as a socioeconomic system with
at least the three following institutional features:
(1) Wide Dispersal of Capital: The sine qua non of a POD is
that it would entail the wide dispersal of the ownership of the
means of production, with individual citizens controlling
productive capital, both in terms of human and non-human
capital (and perhaps with an opportunity to control their own
working conditions).
(2) Blocking the Intergenerational Transmission of
Advantage: A POD would also involve the enactment of
significant estate, inheritance and gift taxes, acting to limit
the largest inequalities of wealth, especially from one
generation to the next.
(3) Safeguards against the Corruption of Politics: A POD
would seek to limit the effects of private and corporate
wealth on politics, through campaign finance reform, public
funding of political parties, public provision of forums for
political debate, and other measures to block the influence of
wealth on politics (perhaps including publicly funded
elections).
Policies of type (3) should be viewed as being in place with an
eye on the protection of the fair value of the political liberties,
and are therefore closely connected with creating a regime that
is in accord with Rawls’s first principle of justice. Policies of
type (1) and (2) should, in contrast, be viewed as providing the
means for institutionalizing the demands of Rawls’s second
principle of justice. Through a combination of all three kinds of
policies, Rawls aims to specify a social system that has the

necessary condition . . . if the fair values of the basic liberties are to be
maintained.” Rawls (1971): 245-46. But this connection is foregrounded
to a greater degree in Justice as Fairness, where he makes it the primary
focus of his critique of welfare state capitalism.
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capacity to overcome the structural limitations of welfare state
capitalism in delivering a fully just set of socioeconomic
arrangements.
Recent Commentary on Rawls’s Conception of PropertyOwning Democracy
Spurred on in part by the striking arguments of Justice as
Fairness, property-owning democracy has received increasing
attention in recent years from liberal egalitarian political
philosophers. (To be sure, in many accounts of Rawls’s social
and political thought, property-owning democracy is discussed
only briefly, if it is mentioned at all.) 27
Discussions of the dilemmas of contemporary liberal egalitarian
politics offered by Simone Chambers and Will Kymlicka each
stress Rawls’s critique of the welfare state and the implicit
radicalism of property-owning democracy. 28 In recent papers,
both Ben Jackson and Amit Ron trace the intellectual origins of
“property-owning democracy” phrase to the early 20th-century
British conservative Noel Skelton; Jackson suggests that James
Meade’s use of the term (subsequently picked up by Rawls) was
a deliberately ironic attempt to invert the meaning of what
hitherto had been a conservative idiom.29 Samuel Freeman
argues that Rawls’s preference for property-owning democracy
vis-à-vis the welfare state parallels his preference for the
“liberalism of freedom” of Kant and J.S. Mill, in which citizens
take an active role in developing their capacities, as opposed to
the “liberalism of happiness” associated with classical
utilitarians such as Bentham.30 Freeman’s extremely
comprehensive treatment of the full range of Rawls’s thought
also contains a relatively extended account of the distinction
between welfare state capitalism and property-owning
democracy.31 In a related vein, Nien-hê Hsieh draws on Rawls to
argue the case for what he terms “workplace republicanism,”
i.e., the introduction of workplace democracy and limitation of
arbitrary managerial authority; in Justice as Fairness, Rawls
forwarded some suggestive though noncommittal comments
about the potential importance of workplace democracy in
helping to realize a just society.32 This aspect of Rawls’s thought
has also been picked up by Martin O’Neill, who explores, in a
recent article, what he terms “three Rawlsian routes” for
defending some form of economic democracy as a precondition
for a just socioeconomic order.33
Most recently, papers by Hsieh, O’Neill, Waheed Hussain, and
Thad Williamson have further developed both the basic idea of
property-owning democracy and have also subjected the concept
to critical scrutiny. Hsieh focuses on the role of work in a
property-owning democracy; Hussain compares propertyowning democracy to what he terms democratic corporatism;
O’Neill offers a partial critique of Rawls’s arguments against the
welfare state; and Williamson describes how a wide dispersal of
real estate, cash, and capital might be actually institutionalized
and sustained in a property-owned democracy. 34 A forthcoming
volume on property-owning democracy, edited by O’Neill and
Williamson, will take the arguments of a number of these
philosophers forward, as well as include the work of a number
27 See Pogge (2006); Audard (2007).
28 Chambers (2006); Kymlicka (2002).
29 Jackson (2005); Ron (2008)
30 Freeman (2007a).
31 Freeman (2007b).
32 Hsieh (2005).
33 O’Neill (2008b)
34 Hsieh (2009); Hussain (2009); O’Neill (2009); Williamson (2009).

of other writers, each giving further elaborations and critiques of
Rawls’s ideas regarding the institutional basis of a just social
order.35

Non-Rawlsian Arguments for Property-Owning
Democracy
Property-Owning Democracy and Market Socialism
The idea of a market economy based on a wider dispersal of
capital than is characteristic of contemporary capitalist societies
is not unique to Rawls or to the debate he stimulated; nor is the
general search for a plausible alternative to capitalism in light of
the historic failure of centralized state socialism. Indeed, since
the late 1980s, political economists and philosophers have
detailed a variety of proposals for a market socialist society,
proposals that typically offer far more specificity and attention
to institutional detail than the general comments about propertyowning democracy offered by Rawls. Particularly cogent
formulations are those of Joshua Cohen, David Miller, John
Roemer, David Schweickart, and Gar Alperovitz.36 Typically,
these proposals call for some form of community or public
ownership of capital within a market model, while also allowing
for broadly democratic planning of the economy as a whole. In
most cases (Roemer is an exception), these proposals also call
for giving workers effective democratic control of most or all
enterprises. Notably, these models do not require or advocate
political revolution, but assume the constitutional framework of
liberal democracy; nor do they challenge the market as a
mechanism of resource allocation, even when the models allow
for significant degrees of government planning. What these
versions of liberal democratic socialism do insist upon is
changing who owns and reaps dividends from capital. To this
extent, proposals for liberal democratic socialism bear a
significant resemblance to Rawls’s conception of a propertyowning democracy.37
Republicanism and Property-Owning Democracy
Also of relevance are recent discussions by republican political
theorists concerning the content of a republican political
economy (or “commercial republic”) which also point in the
broad direction of dispersing capital more widely. 38 The
proposals of American political theorist Stephen Elkin are
particular noteworthy, for two reasons: first, he specifically
rejects the Rawlsian paradigm for thinking about politics and
instead takes James Madison as his starting point for reasoning
about the content of a commercial republic; second, he explicitly
uses the language of property-owning democracy. Consequently,
the following section of our discussion pays particular attention
to Elkin’s non-Rawlsian arguments for a POD.
The core premise of republican approaches to political theory is
that in thinking about politics, it is not enough only to specify
the moral foundations of legitimate government, or the
normative principles (including principles of social justice) to
35 O’Neill and Williamson (forthcoming, 2010).
36 Cohen (1989), Miller (1991), Roemer (1993), Schweickart (2000),
Alperovitz (2004).
37 To be sure, prominent differences between the two proposals remain.
In particular, unlike most forms of democratic socialism, Rawls’s
property-owning democracy has no role for democratic oversight or
planning of major capital investments. For further discussion, see
Williamson (2009).
38 Dagger (2006); Elkin (2006).
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which government should aspire. Rather, we must think about
how to construct and maintain a regime that, despite the
presence of at least partially self-interested actors, succeeds in
preventing the domination of any one group of citizens by any
others, via either private or public means, while also allowing all
citizens meaningfully to contribute, via the political process, to
influencing the social conditions which shape their lives.
Constructing such a regime requires paying careful attention to
institutional design; to how leaders are selected and to the
incentives that they are offered; to the character and engagement
of the ordinary citizens who are charged with both selecting
leaders and holding them accountable; and, not least, to the
regime’s political economy and how it functions, including the
distribution of wealth that it generates.

This approach to politics is exemplified in Stephen Elkin’s
recent book Reconstructing the Commercial Republic. Elkin
describes the “circumstances of politics” as involving a “large
aggregation of people who 1) have conflicting purposes that
engender more or less serious conflict; 2) are given to attempt to
use political power to further their own purposes and those of
people with whom they identify; 3) are inclined to use political
power to subordinate others; and 4) are sometimes given to
words and actions that suggest that they value limiting the use of
political power by law and harnessing it to public purposes.”
“These circumstances,” Elkin adds, are not “`the best of
foreseeable conditions.’ They are simply the conditions that
obtain as we Americans, like others, go about our political
business.”41

Civic republicans, especially those who draw their inspiration
from Madison and other regime theorists such as Machiavelli
and Montesquieu, characteristically argue that reasoning from
the original position, in the Rawlsian style, can take us only so
far in telling us what a workable and tolerably just political
regime might look like. More than this, such republicans reject
proposals for a “division of labour” within political theory, such
that some scholars, expert in pre-institutional political
philosophy and abstract reasoning, define and specify the
normative principles which should guide political life, while a
second group of scholars, who look more carefully at the facts
of the world, work out how to put those principles into practice.
From the viewpoint of republicans such as Elkin, such a division
of labour is untenable: Elkin argues that we cannot fully make
sense of political concepts such as “liberty” and “equality” until
we have thought through, and indeed garnered some practical
experience with, what it would mean to realize such values in
practice, through real political institutions. Put another way, we
cannot claim that we want something unless we understand what
it would truly to take to get it, in practice, given reasonable
assumptions about human nature.39 One of those assumptions, in
turn, is that political actors often act from mixed or selfinterested motives, as opposed to being motivated by the desire
to realize justice.40

Elkin argues that James Madison’s theory of a “commercial
republic”—a liberal regime characterized by government that is
at once popular, limited, and active—has six central elements.
The first five include preventing faction, preventing a tyranny of
lawmakers, ensuring that lawmakers consider the public interest,
ensuring that lawmaking has a meaningful deliberative
component, and ensuring a measure of civic virtue in the
populace. For purposes of the present discussion, the key
element is the sixth—namely, the “social basis for the regime,”
or in other words, who has property and thereby political
influence in the society, and thereby the capacity to shape how
the regime operates in practice.42

39 Thus Elkin: “In the context of [institutional] practice, there aren’t two
separate judgments—one about values, the other about practices that
will serve them. There is only one: how much we value something given
what it takes to realize it.” Elkin (2006): 77.
40 To be clear, Rawls also recognizes the importance of considering the
institutional implications of a conception of justice before accepting it.
Hence Rawls writes: “It is important to trace out, if only in a rough and
ready way, the institutional content of the two principles of justice. We
need to do this before we can endorse these principles, even
provisionally. This is because the idea of reflective equilibrium involves
our accepting the implications of ideals and first principles in particular
cases as they arise. We cannot tell solely from the content of a political
conception—from its principles and ideals—whether it is reasonable for
us.” Rawls (2001): 136. This recognition on Rawls’s part is important,
but is not sufficient to satisfy Elkin’s objection, on two grounds. First,
Rawls limits his account of the institutional content of property-owning
democracy to ideal-type regime analysis—even though he acknowledges
the possibility that “a basic structure may generate interests that make it
work very differently than its ideal description.” Rawls (2001): 137.
Considerations of the kinds of interests a regime might generate are,
according to Rawls, questions of “political sociology” and not
something that accounts of ideal-type regimes need to consider. In
Elkin’s view, in contrast, careful consideration of the interests a regime
is likely to produce and how they might be held in balance so as to
maintain the regime and achieve its stated values over time is precisely
what “constitutional” thinking must take up. Second, as stated in the
text, Elkin rejects Rawls’s view that the premise of a general agreement
about the content of justice and the assumption of “full compliance” are
useful beginning points for thinking about a workable constitutional
regime.

Madison’s political theory rested heavily on the possibility of
“men of property and substantial community position”—most
often large landowners—coming to take a very broad view of
their own interests. Suppose the public interest and the
(enlightened) self-interest of these men overlapped substantially,
and that these same “men of property” were in a position to have
disproportionate political influence—for instance, by being the
predominant class from which elected representatives would be
chosen. If this were the case, and if the political institutions
themselves were designed to give lawmakers, including the
ambitious, strong reason to appeal to the public interest, then a
deliberative politics that in fact served the public interest might
be possible.43
As Elkin notes, this Madisonian account is a deeply
unsatisfactory theory for contemporary liberal regimes. Broadminded “men of landed property and standing” are no longer the
dominant social class; instead we have the predominance of
corporate property, and corporations are themselves legally
required to have quite narrow interests. Moreover, if inequalities
of wealth and income become excessive, and these translate into
significant political inequalities, as they in fact often do, then we
face the spectre of not, as Madison feared, factional majority
rule, but rather factional minority rule by the wealthy and the
well-off. So the problem remains—what is to be the social basis
of a political regime based on self-rule and limited but active
government?44
41 Elkin (2006): 254-55. Elkin here is quoting Rawls (1993): xvii. It
might be noted that Rawls, beginning in Political Liberalism, does
revise his theory so as to take account of one major fact about the world,
namely, the fact of reasonable pluralism. For a republican like Elkin, the
question is why Rawls stops there as opposed to taking account of other
prominent facts as well (such as large-scale corporate power). See Elkin
(2006): 359-360, n10. For a related critique, see Sheldon Wolin’s (1996)
critical review of Political Liberalism.
42 Elkin (2006): 21.
43 Ekin (2006): 38-42.
44 Ekin (2006): 51-73. Elkin’s argumentation on these themes is more
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Elkin’s answer is fourfold. First, a commercial republic should
be a regime in which the middle class is the politically
predominant class, and can serve as a “pivot” in adjudicating
conflicts between business elites and the poor; in particular, it is
important that the middle class have enough power to force the
business elites to justify their proposals in terms of the public
interest. Second, excessive inequalities of wealth are
inconsistent with the maintenance of a commercial republic,
precisely because they translate into inequalities of political
influence and make relations of mutual respect between all
citizens impossible. Third, persistent poverty as well the
economic insecurity of the near-poor and much of the middle
class are inconsistent with the formation of independent, selfrespecting citizens who recognize the value of deliberative
politics. As Elkin puts it, “To worry about whether you can pay
your bills wonderfully concentrates your mind—but not on
political life.”45 Fourth, the interests of property-holders should
be broadened to the greatest possible extent; this could be
achieved by broadening the ownership of property and capital,
and by fostering a politically strong middle class capable of
challenging elite proposals, such that elite groups must argue on
their behalf by appealing to the public interest.
Consequently, Elkin writes, “in a fully realized commercial
republic, the fruits of prosperity should not be available only to
a few; neither should economic production be in the service of
creating an oligarchy with the status and material comforts of an
aristocracy.”46 Elkin thus proposes ensuring that work is better
paid, as well as advocating the more effective use of inheritance
taxes, and above all widening the distribution of capital—in
short, much of the agenda of what Rawls terms “propertyowning democracy.”47
This focus on capital as opposed to income as the focus of
redistributive efforts has in turn four further justifications: first,
the link between accumulated capital and disproportionate,
dangerous and factional political power; second, the observation
that private relationships of domination rest on the divide
between those with capital and those without, not the divide
between higher-paid and lower-paid workers; third, the
recognition that it is impossible to contain inequalities of income
without also paying attention to inequalities in asset holdings;
and fourth, the political judgment that it is all but impossible as
a practical matter to allow the market to generate wide
dispersions of rewards, and then to rely upon the tax system to
correct the resultant inequalities to a tolerable level. The
beneficiaries of socioeconomic inequality are not, and never
plausibly will be, so committed to social justice that they will
endorse large-scale redistributions of their own incomes on a
regular basis. On the contrary, they will insist on the justice of
keeping their own market-generated returns, a claim that will
have strong resonance among the well-off. A regime that relies
less on post-transfer taxation to achieve a tolerable measure of
socio-economic equality will be more stable over the long
term.48
complex and nuanced than this brief summary can do justice.
45 Elkin (2006): 134.
46 Elkin (2006): 134.
47 Elkin (2006): 292-96. Indeed, Elkin’s discussion goes significantly
beyond Rawls’s own proposals, drawing on some of the ideas (such as
universal capital grants and support for worker ownership of firms)
discussed in subsequent literature (see main text, below, for a brief
review).
48 To be sure, moving towards a broader distribution of capital and
property also would face formidable political obstacles. The view is that
if a suitably wider distribution could be achieved, this would be a more

Here we have a second set of arguments for moving in the
direction of property-owning democracy. Clearly, there is
overlap between some of Rawls’s reasoning and that of Elkin,
particularly in Rawls’s stress on the fair value of political
liberties. What is worth noting here is simply that one need not
share any commitment to the Rawlsian edifice, or to a mode of
political thinking that uses the ideal conditions of the original
position as a starting point for reflection, to reach the judgment
that persons interested in tolerably just liberal regimes should
take an interest in property-owning democracy. In short,
property-owning democracy need not be regarded as a uniquely
Rawlsian idea, but instead may plausibly be endorsed by
adherents of a range of sophisticated theories concerning the just
society.

Policies to Broaden Property Ownership
The idea of property-owning democracy has thus enjoyed
renewed attention from multiple strands of democratic political
theory in recent years. Parallel to this development has been
increased interest among policy scholars and some practitioners
in “asset-based” policy approaches to redressing poverty. The
basic thought behind asset-based approaches is that social
policies should not rely only on efforts to prop up low incomes
amongst the poor, but should also enable the disadvantaged to
gain access to productive assets that might significantly improve
their long-term life chances. Examples of such assets including
savings accounts, educational funds, housing, pension funds and
automobiles.49 To take one prominent example of an asset-based
policy, governments might establish savings funds at birth for
each child and capitalize each account with (for example)
$1,000, in expectation that the value of the fund will steadily
grow over time and represent a significant source of funds by
early adulthood; a version of this policy (the Child Trust Fund)
has been implemented in the UK. Ackerman and Alstott have
offered a much more ambitious proposal in the context of the
United States, calling on government to provide all citizens at
age 18 with an $80,000 “stake,” on the view that having access
to such significant funds would dramatically alter the life
prospects and plans of many disadvantaged, working-class, and
even middle-class young Americans.50
Most of the mainstream discussion of asset-based policies
focuses on individual accounts and on bolstering access to cash
savings or housing. Advocates of property-owning democracy
should also naturally have an interest in ways of broadening
ownership of productive capital. Government support (in the
form of loans, technical assistance, and in some cases capital
investments) for smaller businesses represents one traditional
policy approach; another possibility is the provision of funds or
incentives to allow individuals to buy corporate stock. More farreaching are efforts to turn control over entire enterprises to
workers or to local neighbourhood organizations. As Gar
Alperovitz has documented, both employee ownership and
community ownership (through vehicles such as community
development corporations) of productive businesses have
increased dramatically in the United States since the 1970s. 51
Both approaches broaden the ownership of capital in ways

stable long-term basis for limiting inequalities and broadening prosperity
than relying primarily on continual, large-scale progressive taxation.
49 See Sherraden (2005) for a thorough discussion.
50 Ackerman and Alstott (1999).
51 Alperovitz (2004, 2006).
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consistent with property-owning democracy, as well as offering
other possible benefits in addition (such as sustaining jobs in
poorer or declining localities).
In short, there are numerous practical mechanisms available to
policymakers to attempt to broaden access to capital; most of
these mechanisms are potentially politically popular and capable
of winning support from a range of ideological positions. The
literature lacks, however, a sustained treatment of how such
policies might be broadened and ratcheted up to scale in a
manner which might realize the aims of property-owning
democracy. Ackerman and Alstott’s stakeholder society proposal
and Alperovitz’s arguments on behalf of a “pluralist
commonwealth” come the closest in this regard, though neither
proposal explicitly uses the language of “property-owning
democracy.” In short, there is ample room for further work in
translating the very ambitious aims of Rawlsian (or alternative
republican) conceptions of property-owning democracy into
concrete political proposals.
Similarly, there has been almost no serious discussion of the
politics of property-owning democracy or of the question of
whether and how existing “welfare state capitalist” societies
might be changed into a form of market society more closely
approximating property-owning democracy. Two observations
are in order here: first, the social basis for a movement towards
property-owning democracy is likely to be quite different than
traditional left coalitions on behalf of socialism and social
democracy; the aims of property-owning democracy are quite
different in emphasis (though arguably not inconsistent with) the
traditional goals of labour and labour organizations. Indeed, the
more entrepreneurial, individualistic tenor of property-owning
democracy coheres with Roberto Unger’s call for the “left” to
cast its lot with the “petty bourgeoisie” rather than declining
industrial working classes.52 In practice, a workable politics of
property-owning democracy would need to be blended with
other policies and initiatives more oriented towards traditional
labour concerns about employment stability, wage levels, and
labour law.
Second, while proposals to create Child Trust Funds and
broaden access to homeownership are generally popular, the
most crucial step towards a Rawlsian conception of propertyowning democracy—more aggressive, stringent taxation on
inheritance and estates—is likely to inspire much more
opposition. This is especially true in the United States, where a
concerted effort by conservative ideologues over the past fifteen
years has succeeded in persuading many Americans and
lawmakers that inheritance taxes represent an unjust “death
tax”53; there is also substantial opposition to inheritance tax in
countries such as the UK.54 Serious arguments for full-blown
property-owning democracy thus must be combined with serious
and persuasive arguments regarding the legitimacy of breaking
up large estates through inheritance taxes and other forms of
wealth taxation.55 The argument for the justice of taxing largescale wealth in order to secure the fair value of political liberties,
institute meaningful equal opportunity, and improve the lot of
the least well off in turn mirrors the larger Rawlsian argument
for understanding society as a system of social cooperation
aimed at realizing a common life characterized by fairness, as
52 Unger (2006).
53 Shapiro and Graetz (2005).
54 See O’Neill (2007); White (2008).
55 For a promising argument along these lines, see Alperovitz and Daly
(2008).

opposed to a game in which the aim is to accumulate as many
assets as possible within the permissible rules. The argument for
breaking up large inheritances and the argument for viewing
society as a fair system of cooperation are inextricably tied
together. Without the prior commitment to viewing society as a
fair system of social cooperation, arguments for breaking up
large inheritances are dramatically weakened; without the
political capacity to break up large accumulations of wealth in
practice, Rawlsian aspirations for realizing a just society based
on the two principles of justice will remain tantalizingly out of
reach.
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